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The  waiting  lists  package,  proposed  in  March  2014,  is  the ﬁrst  attempt  to create  a  national
strategy  to reduce  waiting  times  for specialist  care  in  Poland.  The  policy  proposes  a number
of  measures  directed  at primary,  specialist  ambulatory  and  hospital  care  with  the  goal
of shifting  patients  to  the lowest  possible  level  of care.  Initially,  it  has  been  welcomed
by  the  patients  and  there  has been,  so  far,  no strong  opposition  against  the reform  from
other  stakeholders.  However,  this  may  be because  there  is some  disbelief  that  the policy
would actually  be implemented  (due  to limited  funding  available  for its  implementation)
and  because  some  of the  proposed  changes  are  vague  and  have  yet  to be clariﬁed.  OnePoland
stakeholder  group  that may  obstruct  the  implementation  of the  reform,  if  they  are  not
satisﬁed  with  the  ﬁnal  shape  of the  proposed  measures,  is  the primary  care  doctors.  They  are
directly  affected  by  the  reform  and  enjoy  a relatively  strong  bargaining  position  compared
to other  groups  of medical  professionals.  Thus,  the  future  of  the  reform  remains  uncertain.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under
the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Purpose of the policy idea
Waiting times for elective procedures are a major health
policy concern in the majority of OECD countries [1]. They
may  constitute a means of rationing health care services
based on clinical need and may  thus help reduce abuse and
the costly times of idle capacity, but they may  also be a
symptom of underfunding and/or inefﬁciency in the sys-
tem [2]. In both cases they generate dissatisfaction among
patients and general public and policy makers in many
countries introduced a wide range of policies aimed at
reducing them [1].
 Open Access for this article is made possible by a collaboration
between Health Policy and The European Observatory on Health Systems
and Policies.
∗ Corresponding author.
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0168-8510/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. Th
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Also in Poland, where waiting times are more the
result of underfunding and inefﬁciencies (such as poor co-
ordination of patients’ treatment) rather than the need
to ration care based on clinical need, a number of meas-
ures aimed at reducing waiting times (and also at the
related problems of inequities in access, informal payments
and other queue-jumping mechanisms; [3,4]) has been
introduced since the early 2000s. While some countries,
such as the UK, achieved reductions in waiting times in the
ﬁrst decade of the 2000s [21] the measures implemented
to date in Poland seem to have had a limited success.
At the National Council of the Civic Platform politi-
cal party in December 2013, the Prime Minister asked
the Minister of Health to develop, within the next 3
months, a policy aimed at reducing queues to doctors.
This request was  motivated by the political and popular
pressure mounting on the government to take action on
waiting times: waiting times saw signiﬁcant increases in
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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012–2013 [5] and the Minister of Health faced growing
riticism for not doing enough to halt this trend [5,6].
In response to this request, in March 2014, the Minister
f Health presented two reform “packages” aimed at reduc-
ng long waiting times, the so-called “waiting lists package”
nd the “oncology package” [7] (although the two packages
ere later merged into one package we refer to them sepa-
ately and focus only on the measures that concern waiting
imes; measures concerning oncology are not the focus of
his article). In June these two packages were adopted by
he Council of Ministers and presented to the Parliament in
he form of amendments to three important acts: the Act on
ealth Care Consultants; the Act on Nurses and Midwifes;
nd the Act on Health Care Services Financed from Public
ources [8]. The package was passed by the Parliament in
uly [9,10] and signed by the President and promulgated in
ugust [11]. While some of the provisions came into force
ithin 14 days from the promulgation, most of them will
ot come into force until 1 January 2015 [12].
The expected direct outcome of the packages is the
hortening of waiting times for specialist care, i.e. improved
ccess to care. Indirectly, the packages are also expected to
ontribute to strengthening of primary care, e.g. through
idening the competences of GPs, i.e. to improve the
uality of care. Finally, one may  also speculate that
nother indirect goal of the packages was to achieve
opular support for the ruling coalition in the local elec-
ions in November 2014. However, this is more likely to
ave inﬂuenced the timing of the policy rather than its
ontent.
. Political and economic background
.1. Problem of waiting lists in Poland: a short overview
Waiting lists are applied to outpatient specialist consul-
ations and treatment procedures, elective inpatient care,
ehabilitation, and certain diagnostic procedures (ultra-
ound scanning, CT, MRI). The main reason for their
xistence is the underfunding of the public health care sys-
em (see above) but also the poor coordination of patient’s
reatment, especially in the area of orthodontics and oncol-
gy (hence the oncology package, see purpose of the policy
dea).
Waiting times may  vary signiﬁcantly depending on
he area of care, region and provider. In June and July
013, the longest waiting times were noted in the area of
rthopaedics and traumatology of the locomotor system
11.5 months), ophthalmology (7.8) and angiology (7.2)
5]. The regional variation in waiting times is not only the
ffect of the unequal distribution of specialists, medical
acilities and equipment [3], but also reﬂects the imperfect
llocation of statutory health care funds between the 16
oivodeships that fails to capture the differences in health
are needs among the regional populations (the allocation
akes into account age and sex and ﬁnancing requirements
rom the previous years).Waiting lists constitute a major policy concern in
oland and the perception of unmet medical need due to
aiting lists in Poland is one of the highest among EU
ember states (in 2012 it was only higher in Estonia)y 119 (2015) 258–263 259
and has been increasing over the years [16]. Incom-
plete information on the actual waiting times at various
providers available to patients (the NHF’s website only
has information on the average waiting times for all
providers) is generally perceived as one of the most seri-
ous shortcomings of the system. While some short-term
improvements can be observed (Fig. 1), the overall trend
in the length of the average waiting times seems to be
increasing.
3. Content of the new policy
Changes proposed in the packages concern primary,
specialist ambulatory and hospital care. The proposed pol-
icy bears some resemblance to the measures implemented
in the English NHS, for example, in its orientation on
incentives and the use of waiting-time targets and heavy
sanctions for hospitals that do not meet them [21]. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the policy was  directly
inﬂuenced by the English experience.
The packages introduce a number of ﬁnancial and other
measures aimed at strengthening of primary care and shif-
ting patients from specialist care to primary care (Fig. 2).
This includes the introduction of a “prescription visit” so
that patients who previously had to see a specialist just to
get a prescription can get it from the primary care doc-
tor and giving nurses the authority to prescribe certain
medicines and diagnostic procedures. At the same time,
specialists who are quick to diagnose, treat and transfer
the patient back to the primary care doctor will be ﬁnan-
cially rewarded. Financial incentives were also put in place
to encourage day surgery and shorter hospitalization times.
Moreover, e-waiting lists are to be centralized in order to
make list management easier and more transparent (e.g.
to prevent situations where one patient is on a waiting list
of several providers for the same procedure). Centralized
lists will also indicate the ﬁrst available date rather than
the average waiting time, which should give patients and
health care professionals more accurate information on the
expected time of treatment.
The policy also constraints the inﬂuence of the NHF
on health policy: the NHF should focus on its core role of
the public payer [22]. The NHF contracting is to be based
on health needs mapping according to uniform guidelines
(currently this is done by the regional self-governments on
a voluntary basis) in order to reduce regional inequalities in
access to health care, the pricing of services is to be trans-
ferred to the Agency for Health Technology Assessment in
order to achieve a more realistic valuation of services and
the duration of contracts with primary care doctors is to be
extended to give more stability in the market of health care
provision.
4. Stakeholders positions
Initially, patients were supportive of the new proposals
(Fig. 3) [13], while the organizations representing health
care providers were on the whole rather skeptical about
it but had not opposed it strongly either. The main rea-
son for this was the disbelief that the policy would actually
be implemented due to the limited funding available for
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Fig. 1. Average waiting times for guaranteed services in Poland, in months, 2012–2014. Source: [14]. Notes: The average waiting times shown in this ﬁgure
are  based on the register of patients’ problems maintained by the WHC  Foundation and on the opinions of medical specialists. The Foundation monitors
access  to 43 areas of medicine and monitoring is carried out three times a year. It has to be kept in mind that the ofﬁcial reporting of waiting times by the
providers is inaccurate: providers only report average waiting times of new patients and patients who  are already undergoing treatment are not included;
moreover, providers (especially hospitals) often do not report the actual number of patients waiting for treatment – some report higher numbers of patients
on  the waiting lists in order to get a better contract with the NHF. The average waiting times calculated by the WHC  Foundation are likely to be more
accurate than the ofﬁcial reporting by the providers as they are based on telephone interviews with the patients and thus take into account the barriers
they  encounter when accessing care.
NHF:
• Contracng to be bas ed on health
needs mapping
• Services pricing to be transferred to
the Agency for Health Technology
Ass essment
Specialist health care providers:
• Prolonged hospi taliza on to be
discouraged (length of sta y will not be
calculated within hospital DRG system)
• One day surgeries to be discouraged to
shi more care to outpaent sengs (fees
for one day surgeries are to be lowered)
• “Diagno sc package” to be introduced to
ﬁnancially incenvise specialists to refer
paents only to necessary tests and
discourage repeated specialist visits (1)
• Med ical prof ession als (d octors and nu rses)
to be given more com pete ncies (2)
• Internal medi cin e specialists and
paediatricians to be allowed to work as GPs
(to incr ease th e number of GPs )
• Expensive tests fund for GPs to be created
(enabling them to prescribe more
diagnosc tests, in cludin g gastroscopy,
colonos cop y and spirometry)
• Dispensari es to be integrated with hospi tals
to guarantee further treatment fo r pa ents
who underwent hospital care
FURTHER SPECIALI ST CAR E
CON TRACTI NG
GATEKEEPING
CON TRACTI NG
Primary healt h care providers:
• Introduc on of “prescripon visit” fo r paents who only need a new prescripon
• Paents’ medical records to be expanded to include informaon on chronic
condions , allowing paents to obtain prescripons at th e level of primary care
• Duraon of contracts with primary care provid ers to become indeﬁnite
(to eliminate uncerta inty fo r doctors and assure connuity of care for paents)
REFERRA L
E-waing lists:
• E-waing lists to be centralized
• Waing lists for ﬁrst visit and for
further visits to be separated
• Rules of qualifying paents fo r hip
replacement and cataract remova l
to be clariﬁed (3)
Fig. 2. Measures proposed in the waiting lists package. Source: Authors’ own  compilation. Notes: (1) Medical specialists will receive increased fee for the
ﬁrst  visit if they makes diagnosis, plan treatment and refer the patient back to his/her GP for further care within 6 weeks after the ﬁrst visit; (2) E.g. nurses
will  be able to prescribe certain pharmaceuticals and medical devices (since 2016); (3) Currently some patients undergo these procedures as a preventive
measure.
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POSITION
INFLUENCE
very supporve
strongly oppo sed
none strong
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
PATIENTS
- Polish Oncological Paents’
Coalion
SPECIALI ST CARE PROVIDE RS
- Polish Oncologi cal
Associaon
- Polish Alliance of
Health care Employ ers
“Zielono górskie Allianc e”*
PRIMARY CARE PROVIDE RS
- Sup reme Medi cal Council
- Coll ege of General
Pracone rs
- Polish Alliance of
Health care Employ ers
“Zielono górskie Allianc e”*
STA TUTORY PROVIDE RS
UNION
- Sup reme Medi cal Chamber
- Sup reme Chamber of
Nurses and Midwi ves
Fig. 3. Position of stakeholders and their inﬂuence. Source: Authors’ own compilation. Note: *Zielonogórskie Alliance was established in 2003 and mainly
represents the interests of primary care physicians. It gives them a relatively strong bargaining power compared to other groups of medical professionals
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rs  it has a very wide geographical reach (it represents primary care physi
he  government on the terms of contracts with the NHF and on other issu
pecialist care providers in Fig. 3. The reason for including it under Spec
egins in the primary care sector and primary care doctors will have muc
ts implementation [14–17] and the potential opposition
rom primary care physicians at the implementation stage.
t was also due to the fact that, some of the proposed
hanges were vague. For example, it was not clear whether
nancial incentives for primary care providers would cover
nly the additional tasks they have to perform or also the
urchase of specialist equipment (i.e. ultrasound scanning
evices) that is needed to perform these tasks. Moreover,
he nurses were anxious that, given the low ratio of nurses
o patients (especially in the area of primary care), with the
dditional responsibility of prescribing medicines they may
ot have enough time to perform their core care functions
22].
The real inﬂuence of both patients and providers on the
nal shape of the reform was marginal and the scepticism
f the latter did not affect the outcome of the legisla-
ive process. This is due to the well-established model of
ealth policy making in Poland, whereby stakeholders are
erely consulted (this is a ‘token participation’ with no real
nﬂuence on the policy making and is meant to appease
otential opposition) and the decision-making up to the
egislation stage is limited to the governing party. The pol-
cy has been developed by the Ministry of Health upon a
irect request from the Prime Minister and had passed the
egislative process very quickly, given that the governing
oalition controls the majority of seats in the Parliament.
The scepticism of health care providers turned into
 strong opposition when the reform was passed in the
arliament, as the suggestions they had made during
he consultation process (mainly concerning the lack of
unding to implement the reform, the excessive admin-
strative burden faced by the providers and the lack
f forecasts on the possible economic outcomes of the
eform) were largely ignored. The Alliance of Doctors’ most voievodeships) and it has, in the past, successfully negotiated with
nogórskie Alliance is listed under primary care providers and also under
re providers is related to the oncology package, as the oncological care
 this area.
Organizations issued a statement in which the reform
was harshly criticized as “not only not having a chance
to improve the system’s performance, but even threaten-
ing its proper functioning” [9,19]. The critics argued that,
rather than reducing waiting times, the reform merely
shifts queues from specialized care to primary care (hence,
relatively stronger opposition from the primary health
care providers) [18]; gives the Minister of Health more
power over establishing contracting rules (through the
introduction of contracts of indeﬁnite duration) and the
NHF excessive control over providers (additional repor-
ting obligations). It was  also argued that the reform
lacks sufﬁcient organizational, structural and ﬁnancial
support and would therefore be difﬁcult to implement.
Moreover, providers did not approve that the evaluation
of doctors’ performance was  based solely on perfor-
mance statistics and not on merit [9]. Even the patients’
organizations, initially supportive of the reform, took a
negative stand after the reform was passed, due to the
fact that they lost conﬁdence in the reform’s success
[20].
Given the strong opposition of health care providers, it
is likely that the implementation of the reform will reach a
deadlock. Primary care doctors, who  are affected by many
of the proposed measures, are well organized and enjoy
a relatively strong bargaining position compared to other
groups of medical professionals. They may  thus be able to
obstruct the implementation of the reform. Currently, they
do not seem to be prepared to take on greater responsibility
for more complex care: they are neither well trained nor
equipped to receive patients with more specialist health
care needs.
As of November 2014, turbulent, on-and-off nego-
tiations between doctors and the Ministry of Health
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are in progress. These negotiations concern mainly the
level of increased ﬁnancing for the primary health
care. The representatives of the powerful “Zielonogórskie
Alliance” (see note under Fig. 3) declared that if they
are not satisﬁed with the outcome of the negotiations
its members will refuse to sing contracts with the NHF
[23].
5. Conclusions
The reform is the ﬁrst attempt to create a national
strategy to reduce waiting times in Poland. It focuses
on improving the coordination of treatment and free-
ing some capacity of specialist care by channelling more
patients to primary care. The pressure stemming from the
local elections (November 2014) seems to have increased
the government’s effort to implement the reform. How-
ever, potential opposition from primary care doctors is
likely to diminish the success of the proposed meas-
ures during the implementation phase. Also, with primary
care doctors not prepared to take on patients with more
complex health care needs, shifting more patients to pri-
mary care may  unintentionally lead to an increased use
of medical emergency departments. Furthermore, addi-
tional systemic changes may  be needed to reduce the
inappropriate use of specialist care, beyond the measures
proposed in the waiting lists package. For example, legal
rules are needed to better separate the activities of doc-
tors working in both private and public facilities as they
have an incentive to maintain long waiting times for pub-
lic patients to boost demand for their private practices
[3]. Also, focus on one area of care (such as the oncol-
ogy) may  have a negative effect on waiting times in other
areas of care (with more funds allocated to oncology the
NHF will have less money to contract other services).
The success of the enacted reform is therefore largely
uncertain.
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